

Michael Carlos BEST

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EDUCATION

London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
PhD Candidate, Department of Economics
2009-

London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
MRes Economics with Distinction
2008-2009

University of Oxford, St. Antony's College, Oxford, UK
MPhil Economics with Distinction
2006-2008

London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
BSc Government & Economics with First Class Honours
2003-2006

TEACHING

Class Teacher, Summer School, London School of Economics
EC270, Public Finance, Summer School
07/2009

Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, London School of Economics
EC201, Microeconomic Principles, 2nd year undergraduate course
2008-2009

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

If it Bleeds it Leads: Sensational Reporting, Imperfect Inference and Crime Policy
MRes paper, awarded distinction.
Supervisors: Andrea Prat & Ronny Razin

Crime as presented by the media is ubiquitous and violent. These distortions seem to carry over into public perceptions and policy preferences. A formal framework within which to think about these effects is presented. The frequency of crimes in the public's perception is determined by the ease with which relevant instances of those crimes come to mind. The ease with which different crimes come to mind is distorted by selective coverage in the media. The resulting beliefs about the nature and extent of crime are distorted and this may lead individuals to demand a higher level of spending on law and order than if they were perfectly informed.

Two Tales of Petro-politics: Autocratic Institutions in Oil Rich Countries
MPhil Thesis, awarded the *George Webb-Medley Prize Proxime Accessit* for the best thesis.
Supervisors: Clare Leaver & Kevin Roberts

This paper presents a political agency model that allows us to explain the diversity of economic and political outcomes of resource rich autocracies despite commonalities in economic structures and political institutions. The threat of revolution in response to the manner in which resource revenues are distributed is an informal institution holding autocrats accountable. Countries where conflict is most disruptive experience less conflict, but are more likely to have kleptocratic rulers. Improvements in other

institutions may have the perverse effect of causing the accountability role of revenue disbursement to break down. A preliminary dynamic model in which citizens learn about the revenues controlled by their ruler implies that we should not expect greater transparency to improve accountability in autocracies.

RELEVANT EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE

Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford & The Carter Center Liberia

Consultant, joint with Bilal Siddiqi, CSAE.

Design and implementation of randomised evaluation of Carter Center work on rule of law and access to justice in Liberia

06/2008-

NERA Economic Consultants, 15 Stratford Place, London W1C 1BE, UK

Water team intern

Collection and analysis of data for a number of projects on risk in UK regulated utilities

07-08/2007

Citigroup Corporate and Investment Banking, Global Transactions Services, 25

Canada Square, Citigroup Centre 21-66, London E14 5LB, UK

Service Representative, Corporate Actions

Shareholder meeting proxy voting for Dutch, Belgian and French markets.

08-09/2006

London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK

Class teacher

Facilitation of computer classes in econometrics at the LSE summer school.

07/2006

Fundación Integral Campesina (FINCA) La Uruca, San José, Costa Rica

Intern

Preparation of presentations on FINCA's work to be used for acquiring funding and assistance in program implementation. FINCA is a grassroots Microfinance Institution.

07-08/2005

AWARDS AND PRIZES

2009	Teaching Prize, LSE, Department of Economics & Teaching and Learning Centre
2008-2011	ESRC Quota Award, LSE, Department of Economics
2008	George Webb Medley Prize Proxime Accessit for the best thesis, University of Oxford, Department of Economics
2007-2008	David Walton Distinguished Doctoral Scholarship, University of Oxford, Department of Economics

OTHER SKILLS

Software: Stata, LaTeX and Mathematica
Learning Matlab, Maple and HTML

Languages: English (native), Spanish (bilingual), Dutch (nearly bilingual), French (very good)

LSE squash team 2003-2006 & 2008-2009